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Second, the recommendation that the police should audio- and videotape
defendant's statements should also lead to an increase in accuracy, because it will
provide better, more reliable evidence. And better evidence should have the effect of
decreasing both false positives and false negatives. There are, of course, other costs
associatd with such proposals but they are outside my scope today. But viewed simply
as a maiter of enhancing accuracy, this proposal strikes me as quite commendable.
I will conclude by simply noting that the fourth recommendation has a possibility of
raising some of these other issues but others here on the panel are going to discuss it in
more detail, so I will leave it to them. Thank you very much.
THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CAPITAL JURY SELECTION
Andrea D. Lyon
First, the burden of proof and $1.75 will get you on the bus. There is no such thing
as a jury that presumes innocence. It is counterintuitive. It is not the way we think. Is
there anyone in this room who thinks Kenneth Lay is innocent of anything? When you
start out trying a death penalty case you have an awful crime that people are going to
be upset about; and a jury that thinks: "where there's smoke there's fire." The police
would not arrest someone who hadn't committed a crime. So increasing the burden of
proof is a nice thing to be able to say and may help ajuror who is trying to fend offthe
other jurors. But in real life it is not going to make any difference, in my opinion. My
opinion is anecdotal perhaps, but it is informed by 132 murder trials that I've tried
myself.
I also want to address the Report's failure to talk about not death qualifying jurors.
The reason to have two juries would be to have a non-death qualified jury make a
determination as to guilt or innocence. The only reason to have a death-qualified jury
would be predicated on the theory that a juror who opposes the death penalty-who
would never give the death penalty and thus could not apply the law. The only law such
a juror couldn't apply is the law to impose the death penalty.
If you're going to have two juries, and if that's an option, then the option should
encompass the defendant's right to choose not to have a death-qualified jury decide if
he did it or not. Let me tell you why we don't want that: the most errors get made in the
most serious cases. A jury is far more likely to try to presume innocence when faced
with a burglary of an attached garage than if you're talking about a dead baby. People
feel things about dead babies. I feel things about dead babies. Everyone does. And we
can all intellectualize all we want do, but we vote with our hearts first and then our
heads follow second.
Thus, you end up with a jury from which the prosecution has been able to excuse-
for cause-the jurors most likely to seriously question the evidence. That's what
concerns me about this recommendation. A lot of these recommendations are great. So
when I pick out things to pick on, I'm simply picking on things, not saying that there
aren't good things in here-there are. If the jury instruction idea would include that
they should be written in English, preferably not by a committee of lawyers, that would
be good to. You have to be from Illinois to understand this problem. Our no-death
verdict is: "We, the jury, cannot unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors
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sufficient to preclude the imposition of death." Only a committee of lawyers could
write something that bad.
What happens is you have a jury from which everyone who opposes the death
penalty is excused for cause, from which everyone who waivers on it (if it was Bin
Laden, I could do it, but it would have to be that bad) gets excused peremptorily by the
prosecution. It's been my experience that people who oppose the death penalty tend to
be pretty honest about it, but people who support it tend to lie and will say upon
rehabilitation, "oh, sure, I'll consider mitigation if the judge tells me to."
The death penalty is such a watershed political issue that it allows for the
identification ofjurors who are sympathetic to the prosecution point of view, the pro-
authoritarian point of view. It removes people who have experiences in their lives that
cause them to just say, "hold on a minute, let's compare these two police officers'
testimony and see if there are contradictions." These people get exposed and they're
removed. So you are most likely to have the most inaccurate false positives, to borrow
my colleagues term here, in the most serious cases because everyone who is likely to
question the facts has been removed for cause or peremptorily by the prosecution, who
want, as Judge Murphy pointed out, to win.
Being a prosecutor has got to be the hardest thing in the world because you have
two competing interests: doing justice and winning. In my experience, the ego thing
takes over. I'm talking to a lot of lawyers and law students at this conference, right?
We are all laid back and not control freaks. We don't care who wins as long as the
game is played well? This is not human nature. Thus, I have real concerns about the
recommendation that does not include not death qualifying the fact finding part. There
are lots of different ways you could think about how to avoid this problem, like picking
a larger jury and death qualifying later. I wish the Commission had thought about this
problem.
I would also like to see a requirement of good jury selection. Jury selection is
terribly idiosyncratic around the country. When I'm trying to explain to a client what
jury selection is, they think you just go out and pick them. They don't know that it's a
process of elimination that is carried out in an intimidating courtroom environment,
with a seal, and a person in a robe, and a bailiff who is ordering people around while
armed. It's set up to scare you to death. As a result, jurors look for the "correct" answer
to the question-the civics answer. So, ifajuror is asked by the judge if they will "hold
it against the defendant if he doesn't testify if I tell you that the law is you can't hold it
against him, will you follow the law?" The civics answer is: "No, I won't." But the real
answer is: "Yes, I will." So, you need to be able to ask those questions and ferret out
whether what you have is a challenge for cause or whether you need to exercise a
peremptory on either side on many of these thorny issues that come up in criminal
cases.
So I would have liked the Report to address the concept of individual-sequestered,
attorney-conducted voir dire. My experience is that at the beginning ofjury selection
the attorneys and judge take their time and are careful; they give a lot more attention to
procedural protections. But once the knife is bloodied it becomes easier to kill, and the
dynamic changes.
As for the recommendations that require more skepticism when looking at evidence,
I don't disagree with my colleague here on the panel. I don't think it is going to result
in a lot of acquittals. First of all, you don't get a lot of acquittals anyway. You do lose
cases, if you do defense work, because of presumption and because the police do catch
the right guy some of the time. But it is worthwhile to give jurors tools to
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counterbalance the intuitive belief that the prosecutor's pointing of a finger counts as
evidence. Because jurors simply believe identification testimony, it is important to
explain to them the ways in which to think about what could be wrong. Identification
testimony has this aura of believability about it; and usually the witness believes it
themselves, even if they're wrong. You don't often have people getting up and saying,
"I don't like your shirt so I'm going to just point at you and say you committed the
robbery." Normally, by the time they get to court, through the process of suggestion,
reassurance, et cetera, even if they're wrong, they believe they're right.
Finally, I have to disagree with Professor Leipold about remorse. I know juries care
about remorse. But what if you have someone who didn't do it? What are they
supposed to do? Look sorry that they didn't do it? And how does one show remorse?
Jury studies tell us that when a defendant cries he looks phony, and when he doesn't
cry he looks cold. There is no good way for a defendant to behave that will
communicate remorsefulness, even if they feel it, to juries. So, in the jury instruction
recommendations I would have liked to have seen the issue of remorse addressed, in
particular, telling the jury that remorse is not a reason either to kill or not kill, even
though it does figure greatly for a lot ofjuries.
A PSYCHOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE ON CAPITAL JURIES
Steven J. Sherman
I'm the psychologist here. All the law that I know I learned from Professor
Hoffmann and teaching a course with him on the law and psychology of culpability,
blame, and punishment. And because he's so good, I have learned a lot. I do work in
the area of judgment and decisionmaking: the kinds of decisions that jurors have to
make. So I suppose that qualifies me to some extent.
I have a couple of narrow issues that I want to focus on, but before I begin the
comments that I prepared, I want to take a minute to respond to some things that
Professor Lillquist said about errors in judgment. As psychologists, we know there are
two kinds of errors: misses and false alarms. I too think the Council erred in saying that
this Report was geared to increasing accuracy. It's not. It's geared to changing the
balance of errors. Is that worth it or not? I think the reason this all started was we want
to change the balance of errors. People in Illinois were being executed and they were
innocent. If you want to stop that you have to change the balance of errors. It would be
lovely to say we are going to reduce the false positives without increasing the false
negatives, but you aren't going to be able to do that very easily. So I think that the
Council was aware that they were not necessarily increasing accuracy; but they were
trying to prevent innocent people from being executed. And those two kinds of errors
are not equal in my mind.
Now I want to address the issue of the choice of two separate juries versus staying
with one jury. There are two real concerns that I have with this issue. The first is from
the defendant's point of view. The very language allows the defendant a meaningful
choice between two strategies, as if this is strategic, or about a game, rather than about
capital crime and execution. Imagine that you're an innocent defendant who has just
been found guilty at the innocence-guilt stage. Now you have a choice between two
strategies. "A": I know I'm innocent. I can stay with this jury who has already made an
[Vol. 80:47
